NOTE
COUNTY OF YAKIMA V CONFEDERATED
TRIBES & BANDS OF THE YAKIMA
INDIAN NATION: STATE
TAXATION AS A MEANS OF
DIMINISHING THE TRIBAL LAND BASE
CHRISTOPHER

A.

KARNS

INTRODUCTION

Chief Justice Marshall observed in 1819 that the power to tax involves the power to destroy.' It is precisely this power to tax that
the Supreme Court recently held in County of Yakima v. Confederated
3
2
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation to be vested in the states.
By allowing states to impose an ad valorem tax4 on fee-patented 5
lands owned by Indians and, furthermore, to permit foreclosure on
such parcels, the Court has given the states power to diminish tribal
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 210 (1819).
2. 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
3. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 683, 690-91 (1992).
4. Generally, an ad valorem tax is imposed on the value of property. BLACK'S LAw Dic'IONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990). In the context of this case, it is the tax imposed by the County of
Yakima on all nonexempted real estate within the county. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 82.45.070,
84.52.030 (1991).
5. "Fee-patented" is a term used to distinguish Indian lands held in fee by an individual
Indian from land held in trust by the Federal Government on behalf of Indian tribes or individuals. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 605-19 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 1982) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW] (describing Indian interest in
tribal lands and defining fee-patent allotment). The "fee" part of the term is indicative of a
fee simple absolute title. Id The "patented" part of the term stems from the obsolete federal
allotment policy, whereby reservation land was divided into allotments to be held in trust by
the Government for a period of 25 years. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text
(describing allotment policy). At the expiration of this trust period, the individual Indian
would be given a patent that meant the allottee held the land in fee. See infra notes 44-68 and
accompanying text (introducing allotment policy under General Allotment (Dawes) Act and
manner in which possession of lands evolved from communal holding to individual
ownership).
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land bases, further eroding what remains of tribal sovereignty6 and
integrity.
The Federal Government's policy has traditionally been to exclude states from American Indian affairs. 7 The origins of this policy can be traced to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution 8 and
the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.9 Through these means,
Congress sought to consolidate control of Indian affairs in the Federal Government and to protect the Indian tribes.' 0 Judicial opinions from that era also reflected the prevailing notion that state
governments should be precluded from involvement in Indian
affairs. 1
As the country evolved, American Indian affairs became an administrative burden' 2 and federal policy began to accommodate
shifting attitudes and ideas toward American Indians and their
lands.' 3 Congress eventually permitted the states to become more
6. One author has argued that the Supreme Court's decision reflects a "total disregard
of tribal sovereignty." See Deborah Jo Borrero, Note, They Never Kept but One Promise-County
of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683
(1992), 67 WASH. L. REV. 937, 951-52 (1992) (stating that Court failed to "accord[] tribal
sovereignty proper respect" in its opinion in County of Yakima).
7. See generally William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62
WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1987) (presenting historical perspective on state exclusion from power
over Indian affairs).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 (reserving in Congress exclusive power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
For an analysis of the Commerce Clause as justification for extensive control over Indian
tribes, see generally Robert Laurence, The Indian Commerce Clause, 23 ARIz. L. REV, 203, 223-26
(1981) (citing early Supreme Court cases for support of congressional plenary power over
Indian tribes). The Constitution expressly mentions Indians in two other places. These instances both prescribe that "Indians not taxed" are not to be included in apportioning the
House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cI. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2. The Constitution does not explicitly address the issue of tribal sovereignty or the question of whether
states have the authority to regulate Indian lands.
9. Act ofJuly 22, 1790, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 137 (repealed 1793) (consolidating Indian affairs
in Federal Government).
10. See FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS 1780-1834 1-4 (1962) [hereinafter PRUCHA, AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY INTHE FORMATIVE YEARS] (noting that partial reason for consolidating Indian
policy in Federal Government and away from states early in U.S. history was that, while some
tribes had supported colonists in their struggle in American Revolution against Britain, most
supported British forces, and all Indians consequently required protection from white
depredations).
11. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 756 (1865) (noting that by accepting status
of statehood, Kansas ceded power to regulate Indian affairs to Federal Government); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (holding state laws to be without effect in
Indian territory and observing that all intercourse with Indian tribes would henceforth be
carried on exclusively by Federal Government).
12. See generally INSTITUTE FOR GOV'T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 3 (1928) [hereinafter MERIAM REPORT] (noting failures of federal assimilationist policies); HELEN H.JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR (1881) (criticizing administration of Indian
affairs and accusing Indian Office of corruption).
13. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (describing evolution of federal Indian
policy). Federal Indian policy has undertaken numerous shifts and turnabout,; in U.S. history:
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involved in Indian affairs. 14 In some instances, however, states began to exert control over Indians in a manner inconsistent with the
special relationship1 5 between the United States and Indian tribes.
For example, in Bryan v. Itasca County, 16 the Supreme Court held that
civil jurisdiction grants under Public Law 280 do not allow the State
of Minnesota to levy a tax on personal property situated on a reservation. 17 Similarly, in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 18
the Court held that states lack the authority to impose a tax on infrom promotion and preservation of tribal autonomy, to Indian removal and confinement, to
allotment and assimilation, to reorganization and promotion of self-government, to termination of trust status, to self-determination. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note
5, at 47-204 (documenting history of federal Indian policy). Each shift in federal Indian policy
has been a result of changes in political ideology brought about by changes in the public's
attitude toward Indians. Id. There are numerous sources on the history of federal Indian
policy. See generally AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS (Francis P. Prucha ed., 1973)
[hereinafter AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS] (collecting writings of Indian reform advocates from 1880-1900); FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-1920 (1989) (discussing U.S. Government's policy toward Indians
from 1880-1920, which focused on assimilating Indians into mainstream American culture);
INDIANS INAMERICAN HISTORY (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1988) [hereinafter INDIANS IN AMERICAN HISTORY] (recounting major events in U.S. history from American Indian point of view);
KENNETH R. PHILP, INDIAN SELF-RULE (1986) (detailing relations between Indians and Federal
Government from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Reagan administrations); PRUCHA, AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS, supra note 10; FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER (abridged ed. 1986) [hereinafter PRUCrA, THE GREAT FATHER] (recapping history of relations between Indian tribes and Federal Government); S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN
POLICY (1973) [hereinafter TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY]; S. LYMAN TYLER, INDIAN
AFFAIRS, A STUDY OF THE CHANGES INPOLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD INDIANS (1964)
(analyzing basic themes of U.S. Indian policies and examining principles guiding those policies at different periods in history).
14. See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 772, 62 Stat. 827 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 3243 (1988)) (conferring in State of Kansas criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations within state); Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588, as amended by Indian
Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, and
28 U.S.C.) (conferring limited criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country to specific
states); General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 348-349, 354, 381 (1988)) (granting states jurisdiction over
certain Indian landholdings). For an introduction to the General Allotment Act and a discussion of the Act's practical effect on Indian reservations, see infra notes 44-71 and accompanying text. For an analysis of Public Law 280 and a discussion of its specific grants to the states,
see generally Carole E. Goldberg, PublicLaw 280: The Limits of StateJurisdictionover Reservation
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975).
15. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C.
§ 450a(b) (1988) (declaring Congress' "commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with, and responsibility to, individual Indian
tribes and to the Indian people as a whole"); see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
383 (1886) (recognizing that Federal Government and Indian tribes have special trustee/ward
relationship). Because of the tension between the Indians and the surrounding local people
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it became apparent that "the people of
the States ... are often ... [Indians'] deadliest enemies." Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84.
16. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
17. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 377 (1976) (clarifying that previous decisions in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973), and Moe v.
Confederate Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976), prohibit state imposition of
personal property tax, in absence of congressional consent, on Indian-owned items located on
trust lands).
18. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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come earned on a reservation by tribal members residing on that
reservation.' 9 Furthermore, while upholding state authority to impose a cigarette tax on on-reservation sales by Indians to nonmembers of the tribe, the Supreme Court ruled in Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation 20 that a state could
not impose the same tax on on-reservation sales to tribal members.2 1 Thus, while state activity in Indian affairs has increased, the
Supreme Court has continued to protect tribes from state power by
ensuring that states exercise their power in a manner consistent with
congressional intent.
This Note examines the Supreme Court's reasoning in County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.22
While the decision is arguably consistent with some prior case law
and the strictures of applicable statutes, it conflicts with contemporary federal Indian policy and overlooks methodology previously
used by the Court in cases involving state taxation of Indians.2 3 The
result is that states presently have the ability to diminish existing
tribal land bases through taxation. 24 Analysis of the Court's decision in light of the shifts in federal policy makes the need for a con25
gressional resolution compelling.
Part I of this Note introduces the general rules regarding state
taxation of Indians and Indian reservations, the Federal Government's systematic process of separating Indians from tribal land bases, and the evolution in federal policy that now emphasizes tribal
self-government and self-determination. Part I places these rules in
the context of the conflicting policies embedded in the rules of
American Indian law. A brief account of the allotment and reorganization policies is also provided and will shed light on the attitudes
of the Congresses that enacted the statutes in question. This ac19. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (holding
that Arizona could not impose personal income tax on reservation Indian whose income resuits solely from reservation sources).

20. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
21. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 152-53 (1980) (noting tangentially that states can request Indian retailers to aid in enforcement of tax laws because certain state taxes such as those levied on nontribal members
are validly imposed); Moe v. Confederate Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976)
(declaring that state's interest in collecting sales tax from non-Indians overcomes slight burden on Indian shopkeepers to collect such tax).

22.
23.

112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).

See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing history of Supreme Court
cases dealing with state taxation on tribal lands).
24. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (arguing that allowing state taxation of
Indian lands will erode tribal sovereignty and transfer Indian property to non-Indians
through foreclosure actions).
25. See infra notes 187-96 and accompanying text (suggesting legislation to alleviate effect of Court's holding in County of Yakima).
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count will clarify the reasons why the Supreme Court opinion in
County of Yakima fails to conform with contemporary federal policy.
Part II outlines the Supreme Court's majority opinion and Justice
Blackmun's partial concurrence and dissent in County of Yakima. The
majority undertook a careful statutory interpretation approach in
reaching its conclusion in the case. Justice Blackmun's dissent is important because it points out that while the Court employed the correct standard in County of Yakima, it failed to apply that standard
26
properly.
Part III analyzes the General Allotment Act's 2 7 validity in light of
the Government's turnabout in American Indian policy. Part III further examines whether the General Allotment Act provision that the
Court found pivotal in permitting the taxation of fee-patented lands,
as well as state laws imposing a tax on the lands, should be considered preempted by subsequent federal law. The preemption issue
was not fully explored by the Court in its opinion. This Note concludes by presenting several solutions that Congress might undertake to counter the harmful effects that County of Yakima will have on
American Indian tribes.
I.

BACKGROUND

European pioneers came across the Atlantic Ocean to the "new
world" with visions of taming and settling the vast wilderness that
awaited them. Many felt obligated and justified in invading and displacing the resident population to make what they deemed to be
better use of the surrounding land. 28 Against this backdrop, the
Federal Government's Indian policy foundations focused on expediting its dealings with Indians and acquiring the lands that Indians
inhabited. Accordingly, much of the Government's policy regarding
American Indians centered around land issues, beginning with the
early Trade and Intercourse Act 29 and spanning the policies of re26. County ofYakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 683, 694-98 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). This Act is also referred to as the Dawes Act. See infra notes 4149 and accompanying text (providing brief history of General Allotment Act and Act's sponsor, Senator Dawes).
28. See generally FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM
AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST (1975) (presenting historical perspective on attitudes and ideals
held by European Americans upon arrival and early settlement of North America).
29. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (expired 1793) (providing that
no trading with Indians is permissible without license from U.S. Government). This Act was
the first in a series of temporary acts, culminating in the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834,
which were part of the Federal Government's policy of consolidating control of Indian affairs
in the Federal Government, away from the states, and to keep peace on the frontiers by protecting Indian tribes from non-Indian depradations. Trade and Intercourse Act of March 1,
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3
moval, 30 allotment,31 reorganization, 32 and self-determination. 3
1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329 (repealed 1796) (readopting licensing requirements of previous Act
and providing for methods of enforcement); Trade and Intercourse Act of May 19, 1796, ch.
30, 1 Stat. 469 (expired 1799) (defining boundary line for "Indian territory" and banning
citizens from entering territory without permission of U.S. President or state governor);
Trade and Intercourse Act of March 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743 (expired 1802) (redefining
Indian territory); Trade and Intercourse Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139 (repealed
1834) (same); Trade and Intercourse Act ofJune 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 25 U.S.C.) (redefining boundary and consolidating
licensing power in President). See generally HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 5, at
109-17 (discussing federal Indian policy during Trade and Intercourse Act era). While the
Act and its revisions were instituted primarily to regulate commerce between Indians and
non-Indians, they also prohibited non-Indian settlement in Indian country, required non-Indians to obtain passports for travel through Indian country, and provided for federal prosecution of Indian offenses committed in state or territorial lands. See Helen A. Gaebler,
Comment, The Legislative Reversal of Duro v. Reina A First Step Toward Making Rhetoric a Reality,
1991 Wis. L. REv. 1399, 1405 n.33 (noting that one purpose of Indian Trade and Intercourse
Acts was to control all interaction between white settlers and Indian tribes).
30. The policy of "removal" was implemented by treaty and negotiation. See generally
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 78-92 (discussing federal removal policy
begun after War of 1812 wherein eastern Indian tribes were relocated to western territories in
effort to accommodate expanding non-Indian settlement).
31. Many people influential in late nineteenth-century politics sincerely believed they
could rescue Indians from their "unorthodox" ways by bestowing on the Indians, via "allotment," the virtue of individual ownership. See generally AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 77-145 (compiling writings of Indian policy reformers who believed
allotment would "save" Indians). Individual Indians would be given allotments of individual
parcels of land that could be farmed. General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
Policymakers reasoned that by turning Indians into farmers and surrounding them with
homesteaders who might serve as positive role models, the Indians would become instantly
"civilized." See generally HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 5, at 127-38 (discussing assimilationist policy of allotment, which centered on notion that by "civilizing" Indian
tribes, Indians would need less land and thus more land would be opened for white settlement); see also infra notes 44-68 and accompanying text (introducing allotment policy and its
effect on tribal land bases).
32. The "reorganization" policy stemmed from the realization brought about by the Meriam Report that the allotment policy was a failure and required immediate resolution. See
MERIAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 52-55 (advocating immediate action to help Indians with
medical needs and schooling as well as longer-term strategy to improve Indians' lives). Reorganization immediately ended the allotment of reservation lands, indefinitely extended the
trust period on existing allotments, and placed all remaining reservation lands in trust. See
generally HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 5, at 144-51 (noting turnabout in federal Indian policy toward reorganization of tribes and promotion of tribal self-government
instigated by public reaction to poor conditions prevalent among Indians); see also infra notes
70-83 and accompanying text (discussing reorganization policy and its use as means of ending
assimilationist allotment policy).
33. The policy of "self-determination" is largely the result of disapproval with the policy
of the "termination-era" Congress that sought to end the Indian lands trust relationship in
order to alleviate the burden placed by that relationship on the Federal Government. See
PHILP, supra note 13, at 194-95 (noting congressional desire to stop treating Indian tribes as
nations dependent on United States, in order to reduce burden of allocation of federal resources). The policy of termination came to an abrupt halt in 1961 and the Federal Government provided means for preserving and extending the tribal land base. See generally
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 5, at 180-206 (discussing end of termination
era and start of modern policy of tribal self-determination and statutes passed in accordance
with that continuing policy).
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Applicability of State Laws to TribalIndians on Indian Reservations

Unless expressly provided for by Congress, state laws are generally not applicable to tribal Indians on Indian reservations.3 4 There
is no established per se rule barring state jurisdiction over tribes
and tribal members, however.3 5 Yet, in the specific area of state taxation,3 6 the Supreme Court has adopted a per se rule that the Indian
exemption from state taxation will be removed only when Congress
37
makes its intent "unmistakably dear" to so remove the exemption.
Evaluation of the permissibility of state jurisdictional assertions
over tribal members requires a preemption analysis. 3 8 State law is
preempted if it "interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal
interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake
34.

See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973) (citing

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 845 (1958), and noting that state

jurisdiction generally does not extend to Indian country).
35. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1987) (noting that Supreme Court has not established per se rule forbidding state from exercising jurisdiction over tribes and tribal members absent express consent by Congress).
36. The Supreme Court has distinguished state taxation from other assertions of state
jurisdiction. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (distinguishing
"special area of state taxation" from general state laws). Taxation laws are regulatory in nature. With respect to the grants ofjurisdiction stemming from Public Law 280, see Pub. L.
No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 (1988)), the Court has held that states may impose criminal laws that are prohibitory
in nature, but not civil laws that are regulatory in nature. See CabazonBand, 480 U.S. at 208-10
(limiting scope of state laws applicable to reservation Indians under Public Law 280 to those
prohibitory in nature, but concluding that there is no "bright-line rule" for determining
whether laws are prohibitory or regulatory in nature); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,
384-85 (1976) (holding Public Law 280 to be grant of state court jurisdiction over private civil
litigation involving reservation Indians, but stating that regulatory civil laws are not applicable
to reservation Indians).
37. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 215-16 n.17 (noting that strong presumption of Indian
immunity from state taxation gives rise to per se rule requiring showing of unmistakable congressional intent); see also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1985) (noting
that Indian tribes are generally exempt from state taxation but that Congress has authority to
allow imposition of state taxes on tribes and tribal members). Absent cessation ofjurisdiction
or other federal statutes allowing it, however, there has been no satisfactory authority for
subjecting Indian reservation lands to state taxation. Mescalero Apache Tribe v.Jones, 411 U.S. at
148. Thus, there is a presumption of tribal immunity from state tax regulation. However, a
state may validly assert its authority over on-reservation activities of nonmembers under certain circumstances and over the on-reservation activities of tribal members in exceptional circumstances. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331-32 n.15 (1983)
(citing examples of allowable state regulation of fishing by tribal members and of land within
reservation boundaries not belonging to tribe).
The "unmistakably clear" intent rule has been referred to as a "clear statement rule." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611-12 (1992) (discussing development and use of
"clear statement rule" in constitutional law). Clear statement rules provide that the canons of
construction of federal Indian jurisprudence will apply only when congressional intent is unclear. See South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986) (holding
that "[t]he canon of construction regarding the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indians
... [does not] permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of Congress").
38. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 333-34 (noting requirement for
preemption analysis that balances federal and tribal interests against state interests).
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are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority."' 9 In preemption inquiries, the Supreme Court has chosen to proceed in
light of the traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the goal of
promoting Indian self-government, including Congress' "overriding goal" of fostering economic development and tribal self40
sufficiency.
B.
1.

An Overview of Relevant Federal Indian Policies

Assimilation by allotment

The Federal Government's policies of removing Indians from
their aboriginal homelands to provide for white settlement and of
subsequently confining Indians to reservations 4 1 met with growing
disapproval in the 1870s and 1880s. 4 2 Indian advocates began annual meetings working toward Indian policy reform that would answer the "Indian Question." 4 3 These reformers, who tended to be
39.

Id

40. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (citing
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334-35, for proposition that Indian self-sufficiency and economic development is Congress' overriding goal); New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334-35 (rejecting notion that state jurisdiction over Indians is governed by traditional preemption principles and declaring that, in Indian cases, attention must
be paid to general federal and tribal interests as well as to congressional intent to preempt
state law); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (noting that
Indian sovereignty predates that of United States and that treaty agreements must be read
with this traditional sovereignty in mind); see also Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,
14-15 (1987) (noting federal policy favoring tribal self-government and subsequent limitation
on state court jurisdiction over tribal activities); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980) (declaring that unique qualities of tribal sovereignty demand
different approach to preemption issue than usual federal/state questions).
41. The removal and reservation policies of the Federal Government were successful
only to the point that they were able to separate the Indians from the often aggressive actions
of frontier settlers. See generally HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 5, at 78-92,

121-25 (discussing federal policies of removing Indian Nations and confining them to reservations in order to make room for United States expansion westward and to protect Indian
lands from encroachment by white settlers).
This Part of the Note is not intended to be a thorough overview of federal Indian policy.
Such a presentation is well beyond the scope of this Note, as federal policy has sustained
cycles of assimilation and tribal enhancement that developed with changes in American politics and public attitudes towards Indians. The intention of this Part is to present in a concise
fashion those aspects of federal Indian policy that are pertinent to the discussion and analysis
of County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 111 S.Ct.
683 (1992). For a more thorough introduction to federal Indian policy, see generally ROBERT
N. CLINTON ET. AL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 137-65 (3d ed. 1991) (providing overview of different periods in U.S. Indian policy); DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 33-160 (1986) (describing legal perspective of different eras of federal Indian
policy); see also supra note 13 (citing other works that represent excellent resources in study of
federal Indian policy).
42. See PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, supra note 13, at 183-90 (noting Indian resistance to
relocation and subsequent public criticism of policy after Federal Government used harsh
measures to quell Indian resistance).
43. See AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 13, at 1-10 (describing genesis
of Indian reform movement that led to yearly conferences at Lake Mohonk near New Paltz,
New York). The Lake Mohonk Conferences of Friends of the Indian were symposiums
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proponents of assimilation, 4 4 developed a policy whereby the Indians would receive land allotments issuing from their reservations in
severalty. 4 5 The "surplus" land, that which had not been allotted,
would then be opened to white settlement. 4 6 These advocates were
successful in gaining the support of Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. 47 Under Dawes' sponsorship, Congress passed the Gen49
eral Allotment (Dawes) Act of 188748 with minimal opposition.
whereby well-meaning and politically influential reformers developed a solution to the "Indian problem," remarkably without input from the Indians themselves. See id. at 1 (noting
reformers' disinclination to view existing Indian civilization positively and to include Indians
in discussions about their own futures). The reformers recognized a common theme to the
problem, which consisted of trying to balance the need for land for white settlement with
protecting the Indians from encroachment by aggressive white settlers. See generally id (compiling speeches and writings of Indian reform groups, as well as congressional reports relating
to issues addressed at Lake Mohonk Conferences). Allotment, education, and the grant of
citizenship constituted the means toward achieving the reformers' goal of acculturating and
assimilating the Indians into mainstream American society. See id. at 6-7 (stating Friends of
Indian position that complete Americanization was best solution to Indian question). Some of
these Indian reform organizations included the Boston Indian Citizenship Committee, the
Women's National Indian Association, and the Indian Rights Association. Id. at 4-5. While
well-meaning, these reformers were unable to foresee the dire consequences of thrusting a
foreign culture and lifestyle upon the Native Americans, people with differing ideas and values. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-21 (documenting effects of forced assimilation and
acculturation on Indians).
44. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 128-29 (describing assimilation movement as having been led by "zealous humanitarians").
45. LETrER FROM E.A. HAYT, COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, TO CARL SCHURZ, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR (Jan. 24, 1879), H.R. REP. No. 165, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. 2-3 (1879),
reprintedin AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 79-82 (urging Secretary of
Interior to recommend to Congress proposed general land in severalty legislation providing
division of Indian reservations into individual homesteads for individual Indian ownership).
Upon learning that Congress passed allotment legislation, one Lake Mohonk speaker proclaimed, "[The Dawes Act] has given us what Archimedes wished for, that he might test the
power of his lever to lift the world, and now we have a standing place, an opportunity to test
the power of our civilizing influence to lift the Indian." INDIANS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra
note 13, at 213.
46. Carl Schurz, Recommendation of Land in Severalty, Report of Nov. 1, 1880, H.R. EXEC.
Doc. No. 1, 46th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-6, 11-13 (1880), reprintedin AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN
INDIANS, supra note 13, at 84-86 (advocating general allotment law that would protect Indian
interests by giving them legal title to lands enforceable in U.S. courts, thereby putting Indians
on equal footing with whites). The Secretary of the Interior thought that by selling off the
Indian lands "not needed," the dangers of white encroachment would be eliminated and Indians would be placed on an equal footing with their white counterparts. Id.
47. See AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 100 (noting that Senator
Dawes was initially reluctant to support general allotment law, but later supported it when he
felt Indian land could not be protected otherwise).
48. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 348349, 354, 381 (1988)).
49. While allotment was not a new concept, the General Allotment Act was the first comprehensive allotment plan, incorporating many of the views and ideas held by various legislators. Pre-Act allotments had been used as a means of terminating tribal existence. See
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 130 (discussing pre-Act allotment plans
that often consisted of Indians surrendering claims to tribal lands in return for U.S. citizenship). In earlier plans, tribal existence was terminated once Indian allottees relinquished their
interests in tribal lands and became subject to state and federal jurisdiction as citizens. See,
e.g., Treaty with the Wyandot Indians, Apr. 1, 1850, U.S.-Wyandot Indians, 9 Stat. 987 (declaring "anxious desire" of Wyandot Indians to trade territory for citizenship); Treaty with
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The Act authorized the President to allot parcels of tribal lands to
individual Indians.50 The patents issued on the allotments were
held by the United States in trust for a period of twenty-five years,
after which time the land would be held in fee by the allottee upon
receipt of the patent.5 ' A major reason behind use of the extensive
trust period was a perceived need to protect allottees from state
laws while they became assimilated into mainstream American culture.5 2 Once the trust period expired,5 3 the Act subjected the allot54
tees to state criminal and civil laws, including taxation laws.

In 1906, Congress amended section 6 of the General Allotment
Act, which subjected Indians holding fee-patented lands to state jurisdiction, by means of the Burke Act. 55 The Burke Act clarified the
important point that the extension of state jurisdiction would be
delayed until the trust period had expired 5 6 The Burke Act rethe Stockbridge Tribe of Indians, Nov. 24, 1848, U.S.-Stockbridge Tribe of Indians, 9 Stat.
955 (agreeing to pay Stockbridge Tribe $14,504.85 for tribal lands); Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch.
83, 5 Stat. 349 (allowing for division of tribal lands of Menomonie Indians into individual lots
and granting citizenship to tribal members). These pre-Dawes plans were experiments in
allotment that would subsequently serve as models for the federal policy of general allotment.
See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 5, at 130-32 (describing genesis of General
Allotment Act in early allotment experiments with specific tribes).
50. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388, 388 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)) (authorizing President to distribute reservation lands to individual
Indians in cases where land could be used for agricultural purposes).
51. Id- § 5, 24 Stat. at 389-90 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348). This section
further provides that encumbrances and conveyances are void and authorizes the Secretary of
the Interior to negotiate for the purchase of "surplus" lands. Id. The purchase money is held
by the Treasury of the United States in trust for the tribe. Id.
52. Prior experience with the allotment process demonstrated that white traders and
land companies rapidly acquired the lands allotted to the Indians, by fraud or otherwise. See
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 5, at 130 (noting several consequences of preAct allotments); see also COMM. ON THE TERRITORIES, H.R. REP. No. 188, 45th Cong., 3d Sess.
13-26 (1879) (noting failures of allotment experiments by treaties with various Indian tribes).
53. Extension of the trust period beyond the stipulated 25 years was left to the President's discretion. Act ofJune 21, 1906, ch. 3504, § 1, 34 Stat. 325, 326 (current version at 25
U.S.C. § 391 (1988)).
54. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. at 390 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)).
55. Id., as amended by Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, 182-83 (1906) (current version at
25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)).
56. Id, Section 6 of the General Allotment Act provides in pertinent part:
At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the
Indians by patent in fee, . . . then each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and
be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they
may reside.
25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988). The Burke Act amended section 6 of the General Allotment Act by
adding the following:
Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his [or her] discretion, and he [or
she] is authorized, whenever he [or she] shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is
competent and capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be
issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale,
incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed ....
Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, 182-83 (1906) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988))
(emphasis added).
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flected congressional disapproval of the Supreme Court's holding in
Matter of Heff. 57 In Heft, the Court held that when an allotment is
made and a patent issued, the allottee immediately becomes a U.S.
citizen and is therefore no longer subject to federal liquor law restrictions that are aimed exclusively at Indians. 58 The Court interpreted the General Allotment Act as subjecting allottees to state
laws upon issuance of patents, despite the fact that the Federal Government holds the patents in temporary trust. 59 To remedy the impact of the Court's holding, the Burke Act made the grant of
citizenship, and therefore the subjection to state jurisdiction, conditional upon actual receipt of the patent to the allotted land. 60 While
also expressly removing restrictions against "sale, incumbrances, or
taxation of said land," 61 the Burke Act further permitted the Secretary of the Interior to issue patents to competent allottees before
the expiration of the twenty-five-year trust period. 62
A major consequence of the General Allotment Act was a reduction in Indian landholdings from 138 million acres to 48 million
acres. 63 The sale of surplus lands not needed for apportionment to
tribal members was largely responsible for this loss. 64 Adding fur-

ther to the decline in the land base was the fact that allotments fell
out of trust when the trust period expired. 65 When this happened,
much of the land was taken from the allottees at forced tax sales and
mortgage foreclosures. 66 Although repudiated by the Indian Reor57. 197 U.S. 488 (1905); see County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1992) (noting that Congress implemented Burke
Act to change outcome of Supreme Court decision in Matter of Heff).
58. Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 509 (1905) (holding that granting of citizenship to
Indian allottee places allottee outside of reach of Congress' policing regulations).
59. 1&
60. Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, 182-83 (1906) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349
(1988)); see
also HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 134 (noting that Burke Act
delayed state extension of civil and criminal jurisdiction until trust period expired).
61. Burke Act, 34 Stat. at 182-83.
62. Id.
63. See PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, supra note 13, at 305 (noting testimony before congressional committee on proposed legislation to reverse effects of General Allotment Act in
which estimated 90 million acres of tribal lands were lost due to sale of surplus lands under
allotment process). While the pace of surplus land sales was fairly moderate for the first 15
years under the Act, the rate was drastically increased in 1903 as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66
(1903) (holding that Congress has power to dispose of tribal lands without tribal consent).
64. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 138 (noting that of 156 million acres of Indian-held lands in 1881, 60 million were transferred to non-Indians as "surplus" after allotment).
65. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 5, at 136-38 (noting that Burke Act
gave Secretary of Interior power to allow Indians to transfer fee title to allotted land and that
by 1934, 27 million acres of allotted land had been sold by Indians).
66. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 422 (1989) (noting that nonmembers of Indian tribes acquired substantial portions of
allotted lands over time through means such as sale and inheritance); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
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ganization Act of 1934,67 the General Allotment Act has never been
repealed by Congress and remains good law. 68 Consequently, the

tribal land base has diminished in size and many reservations today
are composed of both fee-patented and trust lands, resulting in what
is often referred to as a "checkerboard pattern." 69
2. Indian reorganization: promotion of tribal self-government and selfdetermination
With a new generation of individuals and organizations questioning and reevaluating Indian policy, a national advisory group on Indian affairs recommended a policy change in 1924.70 With the
publication of the Meriam Report, a study on federal Indian policies' effects on Indians, 7 1 it became evident that allotment was a
complete failure. 72 The report showed that Indians were not becoming assimilated and acculturated, as was the goal of federal Indian policy at the time. 73 Instead, the report disclosed that Indians
were living in deplorable conditions; poverty and disease permeated
life for a majority of reservation Indians. 74 The Meriam Report furAMERICAN INDIAN LAW 19-22 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that effects of General Allotment Act on
tribal landholdings included tribal dispossession under both legal and illegal means).
67. 25 U.S.G. §§ 461-479 (1988).
68. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 348-349, 354, 381 (1988) (containing current
version of General Allotment Act). While the General Allotment Act has not been repealed,
allotment ended in 1934 with the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-479 (1988). See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text (discussing history and purpose of Indian Reorganization Act).
69. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430 (referring to intermixed trust and fee land ownership on
reservations as "checkerboard"). It is precisely this checkerboard effect that has created the
difficulties in ascertaining jurisdiction in Indian country. See Robert N. Clinton, CriminalJurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIz. L. R.v. 503, 507-13
(1976) (analyzing criminal jurisdiction difficulties in Indian country that arose as consequence
of General Allotment Act and continued federal incursion upon tribal sovereignty).
70.

See COMMiTrEE OF ONE HUNDRED, THE INDIAN PROBLEM, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 149,

68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-15 (1924) (criticizing administration of Indian affairs and recommending immediate reassessment and modification of that administration).
71. See MERIAM REPORT, supra note 12 (presenting nongovernmental, two-year study of
Indian Bureau that examined Indian policy administration and its impact on life of Indians);
see also HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 144-45 (discussing Meriam Report
and its impact on Indian policy). The report documented the deleterious effect of allotment
and forced assimilation on reservation Indians. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 21-22.
72. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 144-45 (noting that Meriam
Report, which advocated respect and tolerance for Indian cultures, publicized failed assimilation and acculturation goals of allotment policy).
73. See MERIAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 8 (stating that work of Government with regard
to education and advancement of Indians had been largely ineffective).
74. See MERIAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 308 (finding that living conditions such as overcrowding, lack of sanitary facilities, and poor diet were contributing to Indians' poor health,
especially regarding spread and development of diseases such as tuberculosis); see also HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 144 (discussing Meriam Report as "a primary
catalyst for change" that stressed need for educational programs designed to overcome
problems of reservation life).
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ther criticized Indian policy administration, finding it to be inefficient, paternalistic, and destructive. 75 In response to this report and
to changing attitudes toward allotment and assimilationist policies,
Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).76
Reorganization was an attempt, under the aegis of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to promote and encourage tribal self-determination, economic development, and cultural plurality. 77 The IRA

prohibited further allotment of tribal lands 78 and indefinitely extended the period of existing trusts. 79 Attempting to expand the
already greatly diminished tribal land base, 80 the Act further authorized the Secretary of the Interior to purchase lands on behalf of Indian tribes. 81 The IRA provided that these newly purchased lands
would be exempt from state and local taxation 2 and authorized the
appropriation of funds for promoting economic development in Na83
tive American communities.
75. See MERIAM REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-51 (criticizing Indian Service for its failure,
among other shortcomings, to recognize and remedy problems, appreciate need for added
services such as formal education, and provide sufficient health care). The Meriam Report
concluded that the administration of Indian policy neither encouraged nor supported Indian
self-sufficiency and, accordingly, recommended immediate resolution of this deficiency. Id.at
21-22.
76. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988). The Act, also referred to as the Wheeler-Howard Act,
was pushed through Congress by the persistence of John Collier, then-commissioner of Indian Affairs. See PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, supra note 13, at 316-25 (noting efforts of Commissioner Collier in promoting reorganization legislation).
Interestingly, the IRA did not automatically apply to all reservations. Instead, the Act
granted reservations the option of being excluded from its application. 25 U.S.C. § 476
(1988). A reservation would be excluded if, in a special election called by the Secretary of the
Interior, a majority of the adult Indians voted for exclusion from the Act. Id. Through special
referendums from 1934-1936, 181 tribes voted for application of the Act and 77 rejected it.
PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, supra note 13, at 324 (discussing referendum process for accepting and rejecting application under IRA and detailing specific results). Because of a failure to hold these special referendums, 14 other groups came under the operation of the Act.

Id
77. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 147 (explaining need for
reform in Indian policy as reason behind reorganization); PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, supra
note 13, at 316-25 (noting forces and reasoning behind promotion of Indian reorganization).
78. See 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988) (providing that "no land of any Indian reservation, created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians ... shall be allotted in severalty to
any Indian").
79. Id. § 462 (providing that "[t]he existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian
lands and any restriction on alienation thereof are extended and continued until otherwise
directed by Congress").
80. See PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, supra note 13, at 305 (noting testimony regarding
Indians' diminishing land base before congressional committee considering legislation reversing general allotment). It has been estimated that Indian tribes lost as much as 90 million of
138 million acres through general allotment. Ia81. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1988) (authorizing annual appropriations of up to $2 million for
these purchases).
82. Id. Because federal trust lands are exempt from state and local taxation, the General
Allotment Act provided that lands purchased to expand tribal land bases would be held in
trust by the Federal Government on behalf of the tribes. Id.
83. 25 U.S.C. § 470 (1988). The IRA fostered economic development by originally es-
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A.

FactualBackground and ProceduralHistory

In November 1987, Yakima County scheduled a tax foreclosure
sale on thirty-seven parcels of fee-patented reservation land owned
by thirty-one different tribal members of the Yakima Indian Nation. 84 The sale was the result of the tribal members' inability to pay

the County's ad valorem real estate tax.8 5 In response, the Yakima
Nation filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.86 The Nation included a second cause of
action seeking to halt Yakima County's assessment and collection of
an excise tax on the sale of fee-patented lands.8 7
The district court relied predominantly on Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes8 8 in granting summary judgment for the
Yakima Nation; the court was unable to find a meaningful distinction between Yakima County's claims and the claims of the State of

tablishing a $10 million revolving fund from which the Secretary of Interior could make loans
to tribal corporations. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 10, 48 Stat. 986, 986
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 470 (1988)). Subsequently, Congress increased the revolving fund to $20 million. Pub. L. No. 87-250, § 10, 75 Stat. 520, 520 (1961) (codified as
amended as 25 U.S.C. § 470 (1988)). The IRA also authorized preferential treatment of qualified Indians for various employment positions in the Indian service and appropriated up to
$250,000 for student loans for study at trade and vocational schools. 25 U.S.C. § 471 (1988).
84. Brief for the Yakima Nation at 9, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992) (Nos. 90-408, 90-577). Though the
number of parcels at issue is relatively few for the Yakima, the case holding affects all feepatented tribal reservation lands that were allotted under the General Allotment Act of 1887.
See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text (describing General Allotment Act and its effect
on tribal landholdings).
The Yakima Nation occupies a 1.3 million acre reservation in the State of Washington. The
Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, U.S.-Yakima Nation, 12 Stat. 951, was proclaimed by
President James Buchanan on April 18, 1859, and ratified on March 8, 1859. Under the
treaty, the Yakima Nation ceded much of their territory to the U.S. Government. Treaty with
the Yakimas, art. I, 12 Stat. 951, 951. In return, a reservation was set aside from the ceded
land "for the exclusive use and benefit" of the Yakima Nation. Id. art. II, 12 Stat. at 952.
Presently, about 80%o of the reservation land is held in trust by the United States for the
Yakima Nation and its members. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 415 (1989). The remainder is held in fee by the Nation, individual members, and nonmembers. Id.; Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 469 (1979) (describing makeup of Yakima reservation).
85. Brief for the Yakima Nation, supra note 84, at 9. Approximately one-third of all tribal
members owning fee-patented land were at least three years behind on property taxes. Id.
The applicable state statute requires that real estate taxes be at least three years delinquent
before Yakima County can foreclose on the land and sell it at a tax sale to satisfy the indebtedness. WASH. REv. CODE § 84.64.030 (1962 & Supp. 1989) (stipulating necessary requirements
for foreclosure).
86. Brief for the Yakima Nation, supra note 84, at 9.
87. Brief for the Yakima Nation, supra note 84, at 10 (stating that Yakima County had
previously refused to recognize that Yakima Nation was immune from real estate excise
taxes).
88. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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Montana in Moe.8 9 In that case, the State argued that Congress authorized the imposition of taxes or licensing fees on tribal members'
personal property situated within a reservation, on on-reservation
cigarette purchases made by tribal members, and on Indians conducting business on reservations. 9 0 To support its contention,
Montana referred to section 6 of the General Allotment Act, which
purports to subject Indians holding fee-patented lands to state jurisdiction. 9 1 The Supreme Court, noting that the resultant "checkerboard jurisdiction" 92 would conflict with the existing federal
statutory scheme ofjurisdiction in Indian country, 93 held that Montana's interpretation was untenable in light of the "many and complex intervening jurisdictional statutes directed at the reach of state
law within reservation lands." 94 On that basis, the Court declined
to sustain the state's taxes and licensing fees. 95
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded County of Yakima to the district court
for further proceedings. 9 6 The Ninth Circuit held that the excise tax
on the sale of fee-patented land was not permitted and concluded
that the balancing test put forth in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation 9 7 should be used to determine if the
89. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation v. County of Yakima, 903
F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing unpublished district court opinion that found
Yakima County's claims similar to Montana's in Moe in that neither governmental entity is

allowed to tax fee-patented land, pursuant to § 6 of General Allotment Act), aff'd and remanded
sub nom. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 683 (1992).
90. Moe v. Confederate Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 477 (1976).
91. Moe, 425 U.S. at 477 (noting that Montana relied on General Allotment Act to argue
that Congress never intended to withdraw state's taxing jurisdiction); see General Allotment
Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988))
(subjecting allottees to state civil and criminal jurisdiction upon receipt of patent by allottees).
See generally supra notes 50-54 (discussing General Allotment Act).
92. This is the colloquial name given to a jurisdictional pattern in which jurisdictional
status varies from parcel to parcel. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 690. The pattern often
arises in the context of heavily allotted Indian reservations because jurisdiction in Indian
country is generally divided among tribal, federal, and state governments. Id.
93. Moe, 425 U.S. at 478-79.
94. Id. at 479. Jurisdiction in Indian country is divided among three sovereigns: tribal,
state, and federal governments. Certain disputes or offenses will fall exclusively under the
domain of one of the sovereigns, while others may be shared concurrently. See generally, Clinton, supra note 69 (detailing complexities of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country).
95. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 480-81 (holding that personal property tax on property located
within reservation, vendor license fee for selling cigarettes on reservation, and cigarette sales
tax as applied to on-reservation sales to Indians are contrary to congressional intent of General Allotment Act).
96. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation v. County of Yakima, 903 F.2d
1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990), af'd and remanded sub nom. County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
97. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). The Brendale test requires a balancing of the political integrity,
economic security, health, and welfare of an Indian tribe against the state interest in imposing
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ad valorem tax could be levied. 98 The circuit court remanded the
case to the district court to consider whether the taxes would have a
demonstrably negative impact on the political integrity, economic
3 9 Both the
security, or health and welfare of the Yakima Nation.1
County of Yakima and the Yakima Nation filed petitions for writs of
certiorari that were subsequently granted by the Supreme Court.100
The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases. 01
B.

Opinion of the Supreme Court

In County of Yakima, the Supreme Court decided two taxation issues: first, whether Yakima County could impose an ad valorem tax
on Indian-owned, fee-patented reservation lands, 02 and second,
whether the County could levy an excise tax on the sale of such
lands.' 0 3 Before explicitly ruling on either of these issues,10" the
Court set forth the principles it would use in reaching its conclusions.10 5 The Court presented the arguments made by both parties
and concluded that the views of the Yakima Indian Nation, as well as
of the United States as amicus curiae supporting the Nation, rested
on a misunderstanding of the Court's decision in Moe and a misperception of the General Allotment Act's structure.1 06
authority over the tribe. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989).
98. County of Yakima, 903 F.2d at 1218.
99. Id
100. County ofYakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 111
S. Ct. 1680 (1991).
101. Id
102. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 683, 692-93 (1992).
103. Id at 693-94.
104. The U.S. Solicitor General believed that such taxation was impermissible and filed a
brief in support of the Yakima Nation. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992) (Nos. 90-408, 90-577) [hereinafter Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae]. In the brief, the Solicitor General noted that by enacting the
Indian Reorganization Act and other subsequent statutes, Congress chose to preserve reservations as the foundation for affairs, strengthen internal and external tribal relations, promote
tribal self-government, and promote economic development in the tribal community. Id. at 78. The Solicitor General's brief further expressed the opinion that the County's taxes were
preempted by contemporary federal statutes and policies. Id. at 8. The Solicitor General
concluded:
Imposition of the taxes at issue here on land owned by the Yakima Nation or its
members would frustrate (and is preempted by) ... modem statutes and policies, in
the same manner as state taxes on other Indian property and activities on reservations. Those taxes are not saved by a vestigial proviso to the General Allotment Act.
Id.
105. See County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 687-92 (analyzing previous decision in Moe and
examining judicial interpretation of General Allotment Act to present principles Court would
use in its decision).
106. Id. at 690.
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The Court's interpretationof Moe v. Confederated Salish &

Kootenai Tribes
The Court held that the specific mention in the Burke Act proviso
that immunity from taxation is one of the restrictions removed upon
conveyance of a fee patent manifested Congress' clear intent to permit states to tax fee-patented, Indian-owned reservation lands. 10 7
The Yakima Nation did not vigorously dispute this point.' 0 8 The
Nation did challenge whether section 6 of the General Allotment
Act, as amended by the Burke Act proviso, 0 9 remained a valid grant
of state taxing authority. 10
The Court found the contention by the Yakima Nation that the
conferral of taxing authority was no longer valid to be untenable."'
In Moe, the State of Montana attempted to use section 6 to exercise
reservation-wide taxing jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over trust
land." 12 The Court in Moe held reservation-wide jurisdiction impermissible because section 6 only extends state jurisdiction to fee
lands. 113 In Goudy v. Meath, 114 the Court had previously held that
state tax laws were among the laws to which an allottee became subject upon expiration of the trust period under section 6 of the General Allotment Act. 115 The Court decided in County of Yakima that
Goudy was consistent with the decision reached in Moe by virtue of
the extent of reach the State was trying to exercise under the Gen107. Id. at 688 (concurring with Court of Appeals that clear intent is manifested by express mention that taxation immunity would be lifted upon conveyance of allotment).
108. See id at 688 n.2 (stating that Yakima Nation instead objected to taxes on ground that
Washington State's constitution only allows taxation of fee-patented lands held by Indians
who have terminated their tribal relations). The Court noted that the state's constitutional
provision in question merely establishes that Congress has exclusive power and control over
Indian and tribal lands within the state. Id Accordingly, the Court reasoned that if Congress
permitted the state to tax the land, the constitutional provision would not be violated. Id
109. Id. at 691-92; see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing General Allotment Act, as amended by Burke Act proviso).
110. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 688-89 (discussing and dismissing Federal Government's and Yakima Nation's contention that § 6 is "dead letter" within confines of Indian
reservations).
111. Id at 689-92 (examining Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
463 (1976) and Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146 (1906), and finding that Yakima Nation's contention of invalidity of conferral of state taxing authority under Burke Act and General Allotment Act to be unsupported).
112. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 477 (describing Montana's contention that Congress never intended to withdraw its taxing jurisdiction). Montana was trying to exercise jurisdiction over
fee-patented reservation lands as well as over lands held in trust by the Federal Government.
Id. at 478.
113. Id. (disallowing exercise of state jurisdiction over lands held in trust by Federal Government). Many reservations consist of mixed tracts of fee-patented land and land held in
trust by the Federal Government on behalf of the tribe. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text (discussing allotment policy and its effect of dispossessing tribes of tribal lands).
114. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
115. Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906).
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eral Allotment Act. 16 Thus, the Court declined to find Moe's restriction on attempts to exert reservation-wide jurisdiction to be an
implicit repeal of section 6 authority. 117
2. Structure of GeneralAllotment Act
The Court found that the reasoning of the Goudy decision did not
rest exclusively on a section 6 grant of personal jurisdiction." 18 The
Court held that it did, however, rest primarily on the section 511
grant of alienability for allotted lands.' 20 The Court permitted allotment taxation because it reasoned that it would be otherwise
"strange" to withdraw the restriction against alienation of the allotment at the expiration of the trust period "while at the same time
releasing it from taxation."' 12 1 In Goudy, the Court specifically held
that when an individual allottee is subjected to all state laws, those
laws necessarily include taxation.' 2 2 The Supreme Court held that
the Burke Act proviso expressly subjected prematurely patented
land to the implication of section 5 "with respect to patented land
generally: subjection to state taxes."' 123
3.

The ad valorem taxation issue

The Supreme Court determined that the Court of Appeals' holding, which established that the balancing test in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation 124 should be used in
116. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 690-92 (stating that Court's decision in Moe does not
contradict Goudy with regard to § 6 of General Allotment Act as grant of personal
jurisdiction).
117. Id. at 690; see also Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (noting
that repeals by implication are not favored).
118. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 690.
119. Section 5 of the General Allotment Act provides in pertinent part:
[A]t the expiration of [the trust] period the United States will convey [the allotments]
by patent to said Indian... in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge or
incumbrance whatsoever .... And if any conveyance shall be made of the lands set
apart and allotted as herein provided, or any contract made touching the same,
before the expiration of the time above mentioned, such conveyance or contract shall
be absolutely null and void ....
General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 348 (1988)).
120. County of Yakima, 112 S.Ct. at 690-91 (discussing implications of § 5 of General Allotment Act with respect to lands allotted under Act).
12 1. Id. at 690-91 (noting it would be illogical that allotted land conveyed in fee to allottee
should be alienable but not taxable). While it may be "strange" for Congress to have granted
alienability without taxability, it appears even more awkward for the Supreme Court to be
inferring congressional intent while maintaining that it is applying an "unmistakably clear"
intent standard.
122. Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906) (holding allottees subject to state taxation
upon expiration of 25-year trust period under General Allotment Act).
123. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 691.
124. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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the evaluation of the ad valorem tax's permissibility, was incorrect. 125 The Court held that the reasoning of Brendale was inapplicable to this case 126 because use of a Brendale balancing test would
infringe on the Supreme Court's traditional per se rule that state
taxation of Indian tribes and tribal members is categorically allowed
if Congress has authorized the imposition. 127 The Court concluded
that an interest balancing test would be an improper gauge for determining statutory validity because only Congress may decide
128
whether to preempt state law.
The general rule regarding taxation of reservations is that Congress must make its intent to allow such taxation in "unmistakably
clear" terms. 129 The majority in County of Yakima found that congressional intent to permit state taxation of fee-patented reservation
land was "unmistakably dear" in the General Allotment Act. 130 The
Court noted that under Washington state law, an ad valorem tax
places a burden on the property alone. 13 1 Liability for the ad
valorem tax stems from ownership of realty on the annual assessment date. 132 Accordingly, the Court held that the ad valorem tax
was prima facie valid because it was "taxation of land" within the
133
meaning of the General Allotment Act.
125. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 692-93 (rejecting Brendale balancing test as standard
for determining taxation permissibility); see also supra note 97 (delineating Brendale's balancing
test).
126. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 692-93 (noting that Brendale involved proposed extension of inherent tribal power, not asserted restrictions on congressionally conferred state
power).
127. Id. at 693 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 177 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), which
concluded that balancing of interests test is improper for determining validity of statutes because use of that type of test may actually generate results that contradict congressional
intent).
128. Ia at 693 (citing Washington, 447 U.S. at 177, which held that balancing test is reserved for Congress because only Congress may choose whether to preempt state tax law).
129. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985) (establishing
"unmistakably clear" congressional intent standard for evaluating permissibility of state taxation of Indians and reservation lands).
130. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 688.
131. Id. at 702 (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 84.60.020 (1989), which specifies state ad
valorem tax); Timber Traders, Inc. v.Johnston, 548 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Wash. 1976) (en banc)
(holding that burden of ad valorem tax is solely on land); Clizer v. Krauss, 106 P. 145, 146-47
(Wash. 1910) (concluding that ad valorem tax burden rests on property only).
132. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 692 (citing Timber Traders, 548 P.2d at 1083). While the
Washington State Supreme Court's interpretation was that the tax burden was on property
alone, Timber Traders, 548 P.2d at 1083, the fact that it is the individual who must pay the ad
valorem tax means that the tax actually burdens the individual. Moreover, the fact that the
fee-patented land parcels in question were scheduled to be sold to pay off the taxes because
the owners could not afford them, id at 1080, directly contradicts the conclusion that the
burden is on the land alone.
133. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 692.
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The excise tax issue

The Supreme Court distinguished a tax on land from a tax on the
sale of land. 134 The Court found that while the General Allotment
Act permitted the imposition of a tax on land, it did not permit a tax
on land sales.' 3 5 While subjecting allottees to all state laws might
conceivably include the imposition of an excise tax, the Court found
the statute ambiguous as to this concept.' 3 6 Following the canon of
construction in Indian jurisprudence that ambiguous statutes
should be interpreted in favor of Indians, 3 7 the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the tribes on this issue.13 8
C. Justice Blackmun's PartialConcurrence and Dissent

Justice Blackmun concurred in the holding that the excise tax
could not be imposed on the sale of fee-patented reservation
lands.' 39 He dissented, however, with respect to the holding that
the County could impose an ad valorem tax on fee-patented land
situated on a reservation.' 40 Agreeing that the correct standard to
use in determining whether the tax may be imposed is the "unmistakably clear" intent standard, Justice Blackmun argued that the tax
was impermissible under the standard and that the majority applied
the standard incorrectly in three ways.' 4 1
First, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority found "unmistakably clear" congressional intent to allow such taxation in an aban134. IA at 693-94.
135. Id at 694. The General Allotment Act, as amended by the Burke Act, expressly allows for "taxation of... land." 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988).
136. See County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 693 (stating that "taxation of land" may be interpreted as including taxation on proceeds of land or may be interpreted to mean "that though
the object of the sale here is land, that does not make land the object of the tax").
137. See id (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)) (establishing that when faced with more than one possible statutory interpretation, statute is to
be "construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit"); see also Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) (holding that unclear treaty
provisions are to be interpreted in favor of Indian tribes because Indians arc' "weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good
faith").
138. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 694. The majority explained that "a lien upon real
estate does not convert a tax into a tax upon real estate." Id. at 693-94. The majority reasoned further that to hold that a lien on real estate to pay a tax converts the tax into a tax on
the real estate would have the effect of validating "all sorts of state taxation of reservationIndian activities .. . (even the cigarette sales tax disallowed in Moe) by merely making the
unpaid tax assessable against the taxpayer's fee-patented real estate." Id. at 694.
139. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id.
141. Il at 694-95 (arguing that Supreme Court majority chose correct standard for issue,
but failed to apply standard properly).
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doned proviso of the Burke Act, 14 2 which, by its very terms, applied
only to prematurely patented allotments. 14 3 Moreover, Blackmun
concluded that the proviso's antecedent principal clause, section 6
14 4
of the General Allotment Act, was obsolete in light of the IRA.
Second, Blackmun said that the majority inferred an "unmistakably clear" intent in section 5 of the General Allotment Act, an otherwise irrelevant statutory section that itself did not mention taxation
of fee-patented lands. 14 5 The majority held that the Burke Act "reaffirmed for 'prematurely' patented land what section 5 of the General Allotment Act implied with respect to patented land generally:
subjection to real estate taxes."146 Justice Blackmun criticized the
majority for inferring the existence of "unmistakably clear" congressional intent by drawing on its own intuition and reasoning that
the concept of land as alienable and encumberable but not taxable
14 7
would be "strange."'
Third, and most important, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the
majority assumed that it could give no weight to the numerous complex, intervening statutes that unequivocally reflect a complete
142. See supra notes 67-68, infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (noting that Burke
and General Allotment Acts, though not repealed, are remnants of abandoned federal policy).
143. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 694 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). "Prematurely patented" allotments are those parcels to which a patent was issued to an
allottee prior to the expiration of the trust period. See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988) (stipulating that
Secretary of Interior may use discretion when deciding whether to issue patents in fee simple
to "competent" allottees prior to trust period expiration, and that taxation restrictions would
be removed on prematurely patented lands once Secretary determined allottees to be competent). This notion of competency is likely a carryover of the paternalistic attitudes evident in
earlier Indian law opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935)
(referring to relationship of United States to Indian Nations as "guardianship"); United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) (recognizing that Federal Government and Indian tribes
and Nations have special trustee/ward relationship); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (characterizing Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" with relationship to Federal Government resembling that of ward to guardian).
144. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 695 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (reasoning that Burke Act's amendment to § 6 of General Allotment Act must, at very
least, curtail section's validity as measure of congressional intent). The IRA's principal clause,
however, specifically prohibits further allotment of tribal reservations. 25 U.S.C. § 461
(1988). Blackmun's reasoning suggests that Congress may have intended the Burke Act to
continue with its effect despite the subsequent enactment of the IRA, but such a possibility
should not have been considered to meet the stringent "unmistakably clear" intent standard.
County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 695 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 695-96 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 694 (criticizing majority for inferring congressional intent of statute by reasoning that ramifications of another conceivable interpretation would be "strange"). Justice
Blackmun noted that "strangeness" in a statute should be considered ambiguity, and the statute should therefore be construed in favor of the Indians. Ia at 695. He further contended
that while the majority's conclusion is based on its own logical fiscal theory, the conclusion is
ultimately inferred, and Congress has made its agreement with this inferential theory "less
than 'unmistakably clear.'" Id. at 696.
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change in federal Indian policy. 148 Justice Blackmun asserted that
the majority misconstrued the nature of federal preemption by inquiring as to whether the Federal Government had repealed its own
law.' 4 9 In contrast, Justice Blackmun argued that the more precise
issue in the evaluation is whether Congress had preempted state
law.' 50 Moreover, when state law impedes the execution and accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of Congress, it is
preempted.151
III.

ANALYSIS OF COUNTY OF YAKIMA

V. CONFEDERATED TRIBES &

BANDS OF THE YAKIMA INDIAN NATION

A.

Preemption? The Validity of the General Allotment and Burke Acts in
Light of the Indian Reorganization Act and the Change in
FederalIndian Policy

While the General Allotment and the Burke Acts have never been
repealed by Congress, the assimilationist policies behind their enactment have since been relinquished.152 The Meriam Report was
influential in implementing the abandonment of assimilat.ionist policies. 153 Despite the erosion of the rationale underlying the General
148. Id at 694-95. The majority dismissed as a "great exaggeration" the contention that
the permissibility of such state jurisdiction over fee-patented reservation lands would be
"manifestly inconsistent with the policies of Indian self-determination and self-governance
that lay behind the Indian Reorganization Act and subsequent congressional enactments." Id.
at 692. The majority went further to say, "In any case, these policy objections do not belong
in this forum." Id.
149. See id. at 695-96 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing
majority for focusing its attention on fact that General Allotment Act was never repealed); see
also id at 690-92 (Scalia, J.) (examining General Allotment Act and holding that state taxation
authority with respect to Indian-owned fee-patented reservation lands was not terminated by
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 because Congress did not return allotted lands to their
preallotted status).
150. See id. at 696 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
proper inquiry in all state-Indian jurisdiction cases should be focused on whether Congress
has preempted state law and not whether it has repealed its own law); see also California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (holding state gambling regulations inapplicable in light of federal approval and promotion of tribally operated gambling
enterprises); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976) (noting that principle that
state taxation of Indian lands is invalid stems from general preemption analysis).
151. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 696-97 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), which denoted as preempted
by federal law any state law that obstructs execution and accomplishment of congressional
objectives and purposes).
152. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed the Federal Government's departure from the assimilationist policies of the allotment era. See generally ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS
OF THE UNITED STATES 284-300 (1970) (discussing Government's realization that assimilation
policies had failed and examining reform measures resulting from realization); TYLER, A HisTORY OF INDIAN POLICY, supra note 13, at 112-50 (discussing findings and recommendations of
Meriam Report and presenting Government's abandonment of assimilationist policies and
adoption of IRA as efforts to correct damage that assimilationist policies exerted on Indian
culture and welfare).
153. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (describing Meriam Report); see also
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Allotment Act, the Court never definitively determined whether the
provisions of the Act at issue had been repealed implicitly by subsequent congressional action. 154 While it is true that implicit repeals
are not favored as a rule, 55 the grant of authority to the states in
section 6 of the Act does not necessarily remain valid. A state can
be precluded from taxing Indian lands without the existence of a
repeal, express or implied.' 5 6 The inquiry should be whether Congress preempted the state taxation laws involved, rather than
whether Congress has repealed the federal statute. 157
The majority misconstrued the nature of federal preemption of
state laws that attempt to tax Indians because it confined its inquiry
to whether the Federal Government had repealed its own law.' 5 8
supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent changes in federal policy,
from allotment to reorganization, stemming from publication of Meriam Report).
154. The Court went only so far as to hold that a finding that the section of the General
Allotment Act at issue had been repealed was unsupportable because "it is a 'cardinal rule...
that repeals by implication are not favored.'" County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 700 (quoting
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)). This statement suggests that obsolete laws will not be invalidated by the judiciary but rather must be explicitly repealed by the

legislature, despite the existence of subsequently enacted statutory schemes that are in disagreement with older laws.
155. Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503 (noting "cardinal rule" disfavoring repeals by implication).
156. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 696 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that implied repeals are disfavored. Id He
argued, however, that a "repeal" is not necessary to preclude the County from taxing feepatented lands. Id Justice Blackmun asserted that the proper focus should have been on
whether the County's taxation power over the fee-patented lands was preempted by Congress, not whether Congress had repealed its own law. Id (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976)). The note in Bryan v. Itasca County to whichJustice Blackmun cited is
worth reiterating:
The McClanahanprinciple [that state taxation of Indian lands is impermissible absent
congressional consent] derives from a general pre-emption analysis ... that gives
effect to the plenary and exclusive power of the Federal Government to deal with
Indian tribes ...and "to regulate and protect the Indians and their property against
interference even by a state" .... This pre-emption analysis draws support from
"the 'backdrop' of the Indian sovereignty doctrine" . ..;" '[t]he policy of leaving
Indians free from state jurisdiction and control [that] is deeply rooted in the Nation's
history' ....
; and the extensive federal legislative and administrative regulation of
Indian tribes and reservations ....

Bryan, 426 U.S. at 376 n.2 (citations omitted).
157.

County of Yakima, 112 S.Ct. at 696 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
158. See id. at 689-93 (examining General Allotment Act and holding that state taxation
authority with respect to fee-patented Indian lands was not terminated by IRA because Con-

gress chose not to return allotted lands to their preallotted status). The logic behind Congress' failure to return the allotted land to its preallotted status seems fairly clear. First,
Indian allottees lost much of the fee-patented land to non-Indians through inheritance, sale,
forced tax sales, mortgage foreclosures, and even theft. See supra notes 46, 63-66 and accompanying text (explaining ways in which many allotted parcels ended up under non-Indian
ownership). Once fee-patented lands were owned by non-Indians, Congress was not likely to

return those lands to tribes. Second, immunity from state taxation is a privilege the Federal
Government was probably not willing to bestow on non-Indian landowners. Third, many
allotments were controlled by land companies that had entered into leasing arrangements,
some illegal, with non-Indians. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 137
(noting problems created by land company submarket leasing of allotments). Fourth, Con-
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State jurisdiction over Indian affairs is preempted if it conflicts with
current federal policy, unless the state interests sufficiently outweigh
the federal and tribal interests at stake.' 59 In California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians,160 the Supreme Court recognized that the
federal tradition of immunizing Indians from state taxation is
stronger than the state interest in taxing them. 16 1 In Hines v. DavidoWitz,162 the Supreme Court held that state law will be considered
preempted by federal law only to the extent that it obstructs "the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of
Congress."' 6 3 With these points in mind, state jurisdiction should
be examined to determine whether it will be incompatible with fed64
eral or tribal interests.'
Congress has enacted numerous statutes enhancing Indian selfgovernment and self-determination, as well as statutes countering
the destructive and nearly genocidal policies of previous government establishments.' 65 Furthermore, Congress has enacted some
gress was probably less concerned with the easier task of halting the allotment process than it
was with reversing the damage caused by allotment.
159. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (citing
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983), for proposition that state

jurisdiction is preempted if incompatible with and outweighed by federal and tribal interests).
Numerous state courts and agencies have concluded that the imposition of state taxes on
Indian-owned fee-patented reservation lands is impermissible. See, e.g., Battese v. Apache
County, 630 P.2d 1027, 1029-31 (Ariz. 1981) (holding that state is without authority to impose taxes on fee-patented reservation lands owned by Indians); Cory v. Campbell, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 823, 827-29 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding state to be without power to tax Indian-owned
fee-patented lands), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982); 1985 Op. N.D. Atty. Gen. 37, 37 (1985)
(containing North Dakota Attorney General's opinion that Indian land owned in fee is not
subject to county real property tax). Neither the majority nor the dissent in County of Yakima
mentioned these sources, however, even though they were discussed in the United States
brief. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 104, at 8.
160. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
161. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n.17 (1987)
(noting that tradition of protecting Indians from state taxation outweighs state interest in
such taxation).
162. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
163. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
164. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-36 (1983) (holding
that state law is generally preempted if it interferes or conflicts with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law).
165. See, e.g., Indian Education Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 334 (1972) (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (granting local educational agencies entitlement to financial
assistance in meeting educational needs of Indian students); Indian Reorganization Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988) (ending allotment and assimilationist policies while promoting tribal self-government and autonomy); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 19011963 (1988) (maximizing tribal jurisdiction while minimizing state jurisdiction over adoption
and child custody proceedings involving Indian children who are either tribal members or are
eligible for tribal membership); Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2211
(1988) (allowing for tribal land consolidation); Tribally Controlled School Act of 1988, 25
U.S.C. §§ 2501-2511 (1988) (authorizing federal grants to Indian tribes operating tribally
controlled schools); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988) (establishing comprehensive scheme for controlling bingo and gambling operations in Indian country, and noting "a principle goal of Federal Indian Policy is to promote tribal economic
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statutes for the express purpose of expanding tribal land bases.' 66
In light of these statutes and the direction of the Government in its
management of Indian affairs, it is clear that the federal policy of
Indian enhancement conflicts with the state interest in imposing an
ad valorem tax on fee-patented lands located on a reservation and
owned by tribal members. Because the inquiry should take into consideration the traditional federal notions of tribal sovereignty and
the current congressional policy of promoting tribal autonomy, including the "'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency
and economic development,"' 67 the County's imposition of the
taxes and the foreclosure on such lands directly conflicts with federal law and policy. Thus, the Court should have found the
County's taxation of the Indian land to be preempted. 68
B.

"Unmistakably Clear" Intent?

The Court found that Congress evinced its intent to permit state
taxation of fee-patented lands by including the word "taxation" in
development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government"); Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (Supp. 11 1990) (finding that "[a] special status is accorded Native Americans in the United States, a status that recognizes distinct cultural and
political rights, including the right to continue separate identities"); Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. § 5601, and 5 U.S.C. § 5331) (providing
funding to help curb alcohol and drug abuse in Indian country); Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 13a, 450-450n, 455-458e & 42 U.S.C. § 2004b
(1988), amended by 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n (1988) (enhancing tribal governmental control
over federally funded programs); Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437,
90 Stat. 1400 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.) (providing increased funds
for enhancing Indian health care); Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat.
77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.) (establishing $50 million revolving
fund providing for loans and grants to Indian businesses, including loan guarantees, insurance for private sector loans, and interest subsidies); Indian Tribal Government Tax Status
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2607 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
(giving tribes favorable tax status similar to local and state governments to buttress tribal
economic development); see also Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historicand Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REV. 713, 713-15 (1986) (presenting notion that nineteenth-century law was instrument of genocide when applied to Native
Americans). Strickland specifically attacked the removal and assimilationist policies of the late
nineteenth century. Strickland, supra, at 720-35. Strickland argued that these policies destroyed much of Indian culture, while claiming many Indian lives in the process. Id. at 721.
166. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 4, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-340, 94 Stat. 1072 (expanding land base
of Siletz Tribe); Act of Aug. 4, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-337, 92 Stat. 455 (authorizing expansion
of Fallon Indian reservation); Act of Sept. 21, 1972, Pub. L. No. 94-427, 86 Stat. 719 (providing for expansion of Warm Springs reservation); Act of Dec. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84
Stat. 1437 (restoring to Taos Pueblo ownership of Blue Lake, sacred location in Taos culture).
167. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (citing New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-35 (1983)).
168. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388-89 n.14 (1976) (noting that courts
"'are not obliged in ambiguous instances to strain to implement [an assimilationist] policy
Congress has now rejected, particularly where to do so will interfere with the present congressional approach to what is, after all, an ongoing relationship' ") (quoting Santa Rosa Band of
Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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the Burke Act. 16 9 Importantly, the Burke Act of 1906 applies only
to prematurely patented lands.' 70 The majority was able to deduce
taxability of all fee-patented lands from a preceding section of the
General Allotment Act, however, and reasoned that the Burke Act
was merely an explicit expression of the same principle.]' 7 While it
might indeed be "strange" for Congress to allow allotments to be
alienable without being taxable, 72 this uncertainty in the language
of the General Allotment Act is ambiguous, not "unmistakably
3
clear."17
Because Congress amended the General Allotment Act with the
Burke Act, it is hard to imagine that the same Congress would fail to
make explicit an intent to tax all fee-patented land and instead leave
the question of taxation to judicial interpretation and inference.
This criticism carries more weight in light of the fact that it was the
same Congress that amended section 6 of the General Allotment
Act with the Burke Act in an effort to change the outcome of the
169. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 688 (agreeing with lower court in its determination
that Congress "manifest[ed] a clear intention to permit the state to tax" fee-patented lands by
mentioning that immunity from taxation would be "one of the restrictions that would be removed (from the allotment] upon conveyance in fee").
170. The Burke Act amended the section of the General Allotment Act that calls for allottees to be subject to the civil and criminal laws of the states. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988). For text
of the Burke Act amendment, see supra note 56. Nowhere else in the Act is taxation of feepatented land mentioned, and the Burke Act expressly discusses premature patenting and the
removal of taxation restrictions after the issuance of a premature patent. 25 U.S.C. § 349.
Without an exercise of the Secretary of the Interior's discretionary power, as authorized by
the Burke Act, allottees would not receive the land in fee until the expiration of the 25-year
trust period. See supra notes 5, 50-54 and accompanying text (explaining allotment and patenting processes).
171. See County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 691 (stating that "it would seem strange" for Congress in § 5 of General Allotment Act to allow Indians to sell allotted lands without subjecting
such lands to taxation and concluding that § 5 therefore must render allotted lands subject to
taxation). Section 5 of the General Allotment Act provides that the United States shall issue
to the allottee a patent in fee which is "free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever." 25
U.S.C. § 348 (1988). The Court held that this section implies that patented lands are subject to
real estate taxes. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 691. If this were the case, however, Congress
would have had no reason to expressly mention taxation in the Burke Act proviso.
The Court also erred in its ruling that all fee-patented lands are taxable by the state. Section 16 of the IRA provides that the constitutions adopted by tribes organized under the IRA
vest the tribes with the power "to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of
tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe." 25
U.S.C. § 476(e) (1988). This provision, however, is limited to lands owned by tribes with IRA
constitutions and does not extend to lands owned by individual members of the tribe. Id.
Even though the Yakima Indian Nation has a constitution, this argument was unavailable to
the Nation because it is not organized under the IRA.
172. See County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 691 (concluding that strangeness of allowing alienation of land without its taxability necessitates conclusion that Congress intended all fee-patented lands to be taxable under state schemes).
173. One author has hypothesized that the majority's failure to find ambiguity in the
Burke Act resulted from the Court's "total disregard of tribal sovereignty" and its failure to
show "respect to tribal sovereignty." See Borrero, supra note 5, at 951-52 (arguing that Court
failed to acknowledge Burke Act's "seemingly obvious ambiguity" and "denigrated tribal sovereignty" in dismissing Indian self-determination concerns as "a great exaggeration").
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Supreme Court's ruling in Matter ofHef. 1 7 4 In Heft, the Court incorrectly inferred that the General Allotment Act subjected allottees to
all civil and criminal law upon allotment. 175 The Burke Act made
explicit the intention that allottees were not to be subjected to state
76
jurisdiction until they received their patents in fee.'
C. Canons of Statutory Construction
When faced with numerous possible interpretations of a statute,
the canons of construction in Indian jurisprudence instruct that the
statute be construed in favor of the Indians. 177 These canons further instruct that ambiguous statutory provisions be interpreted to
the benefit of Indians.' 7 8 Relying on the same canons of construction, the majority ruled, ironically, that the proposed excise tax
could not be imposed. 179 Under these canons, the statute should
not be interpreted as permitting the taxation of all fee-patented allotments, but rather taxation only of prematurely patented lands.' 80
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Supreme Court failed to recognize and follow current federal
policy in its decision in County of Yakima. As a result, the Court has
potentially subjected thousands of acres of Indian-owned fee-patented lands to state taxation and thus to the risk of loss through
foreclosure proceedings. Procedures are available under the IRA to
circumvent the effects of the Court's holding, but such proceedings
would prove to be too impractical or undesirable to employ.
The IRA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands
by gift to expand the tribal land base.' 8 ' Individuals may donate
their fee-patented lands to the United States for the Secretary to
174. See County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 691 (noting that reason for enactment of Burke
proviso was to change outcome of Supreme Court's ruling in Heff).
175. Cf Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 505-09 (1905) (holding allottees subject to state
jurisdiction immediately upon delivery of allotment possession).
176. See County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 691 (discussing Burke Act as response to Heffand
explaining that Act made jurisdiction over allottees contingent on allottee's receipt of fee
patent, either at end of trust period or at discretion of Secretary of Interior).
177. Id. at 693 (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)).
178. Il
179. I at 693-94.
180. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text (criticizing Supreme Court for finding
"unmistakably clear" intent in Burke Act that all fee-patented lands are taxable when terms of
Act apply only to prematurely patented allotments).
181. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1988). Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act states, in pertinent part:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his [or her] discretion, to acquire,
through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in
lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations,
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place in trust on behalf of Indian tribes.' 8 2 This procedure exempts
the lands from state taxation 8 3 while allowing individuals to retain
possession of the lands. Individuals may be unwilling to give their
land away, however, because to do so would mean losing control
over the land and making it unavailable for sale or use as collateral
for present or future loans.
The IRA also authorizes the appropriation of up to $2 million
each year for the specific purpose of funding land purchases by the
Secretary of the Interior to expand the tribal land base.18 4 If Congress would appropriate money specifically for the purchase of lands
at risk, the newly acquired land would be exempt from state taxation
because it will be held in trust upon purchase.' 8 5 Under such a
scheme, the tribal land base would be expanded and the individual
Indian owners could retain possession of their allotments. The likelihood that Congress will appropriate funds up to or above the $2
million per year authorized allocation is unfortunately remote, however.1 8 6 Moreover, the net effect of this procedure would be that
Indians owning lands at risk would be compensated for the taking of
land they would continue to occupy and use, making utilization of
this procedure undesirable.
Because procedures under the IRA are undesirable and impractical, Congress should enact legislation that would give fee-patented
allotments a nontaxable status. Such legislation should reflect the
current federal policy of preserving the tribal land base and promoting tribal self-government and self-determination. The following
proposed statute would further this policy: "Any fee-patented allotment issued pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887 shall
remain exempt from state taxation until such time that the title to
said allotment is held by someone other than an 'Indian,' as defined
including trust or otherwise restricted allotments, whether the allottee be living or
deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians.
Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act... shall be taken in the
name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which
the land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local tavation.

Id.(emphasis added).
182. Id.
183. d
184. Id. Such authorization, however, has never been fully implemented. Cf HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 150 (stating that IRA failed to substantially increase
tribal landholdings because "Congress failed to appropriate the authorized amounts").
185.
186.

See supra note 181.
Cf Keith White, Senators RailAgainst Indian FundingProposal, Gannett News Serv., Feb.

21, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting comment by Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs that Federal Government's budget deficit problems preclude
sufficient funding for Indian affairs).
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in § 1301(4) of title 25 of the United States Code."' 18 7 Such a statute appears to be a more cost-effective and practical solution than
those available under current statutory schemes.
The proposed statute would legislatively overturn the holding in
County of Yakima18 8 by halting the effects of the Court's interpretation of the General Allotment Act.' 8 9 The Court in County of Yakima
interpreted the Burke Act amendment to the General Allotment Act
to expressly subject fee-patented reservation lands to state taxation
laws.19 0 Thus, with the enactment of a statute that exempts from
state taxation fee-patented reservation land owned by Indians, tribal
land bases would be protected from state taxation and foreclosure
proceedings.
The proposed statute, however, does not circumvent any difficulties there might be in ascertaining whether the land in question was
in fact allotted under the General Allotment Act. Inquiries will still
187. The proposed statute incorporates the present statutory definition of "Indian." 25
U.S.C.A. § 1301(4) (West Supp. 1991) (defining "Indian" as "any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153 of Title 18 [Major
Crimes Act] if that person were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian country to
which that section applies"). The proposed act is therefore fully within the permissible
bounds of legislation preferential to Indians. Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24,
555 (1974) (noting that Indian preference in hiring at Bureau of Indian Affairs is not racial
preference because many persons racially classifiable as Indians are excluded, and therefore
preference is not violative of due process). Likewise, the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1988), is not applicable to all persons who might be racially classified as Indian. See, e.g.,
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977) (noting limitations on jurisdictional
scope of § 1153); Mancari,417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (recognizing that federal criminal jurisdiction
does not extend to many persons who can be racially classified as "Indian"); United States v.
Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding member of terminated Klamath Indian Nation
not "Indian" for jurisdictional purposes under Major Crimes Act, which allows for federal
prosecution of Indians for commission of certain enumerated offenses); United States v.
Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D.S.D. 1991) (holding as not "Indian" for jurisdictional purposes individual who did not enjoy "the benefits of tribal affiliation," live on reservation, or
participate in Indian societal affairs); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1466
(D.S.D. 1988) (holding member of terminated Ponca Tribe not subject to prosecution under
Major Crimes Act despite fact that his ties to federally recognized Indian tribe normally would
qualify him as subject to Act).
188. See supra notes 102-51 and accompanying text (presenting Supreme Court's opinion
in County of Yakima).
Congress has previously implemented legislation to effectively overrule outcomes of
Supreme Court decisions in the field of Indian law. For example, in Duro v. Reina, the
Supreme Court ruled that tribal inherent sovereignty does not include criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). Later that year Congress
amended the section of the Indian Civil Rights Act defining tribal powers of self-government
to include: "the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians." Indian Civil Rights Act § 201(2), 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(1988), as amended by Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, § 8077(b), 104 Stat.
1872, 1892 (1990) (emphasis added).
189. See supra notes 139-51 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's criticism of Supreme Court's interpretation of General Allotment Act structure).
190. See supra notes 118-23, 130 and accompanying text (presenting Court's determination that congressional intent to permit state taxation of fee-patented allotments was "unmistakably clear").
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have to be made on a case-by-case basis under either the proposed
statute or the existing system, as upheld by the Supreme Court in
County of Yakima, 19 t because both rely on knowing whether a given
land parcel was allotted under the Act. Difficulties might arise in
trying to determine whether the land the state intends to tax was
allotted under the Act, 192 or if the title to the land was acquired
93
through homesteading or as "surplus."'
The proposed statute, however, would decrease the available tax
base in communities where state and local governments previously
levied or were planning to levy taxes on Indian-owned fee-patented
lands, resulting in lost tax revenues. 19 4 The amount of revenue generated for the state by taxation of fee-patented allotments will vary
from reservation to reservation, depending on factors such as available natural resources, location, and general land quality. Some local governments are presently planning to levy taxes on feepatented tribal lands. On the White Earth Indian reservation in
Minnesota, for example, the County of Mahnomen, located entirely
within the reservation, is pursuing avenues to levy property taxes on
the White Earth Band of Chippewa's Shooting Star Casino. 195 To
counter these attempts, the Band is considering petitioning to have
the land converted to trust status. 19 6 The proposed statute would
accelerate certain fee simple landholdings such as the White Earth
Band's to a nontaxable status, and the Indian fee-patent holder
would continue to have control as well as possession of the
allotment.
Additionally, an environment where the land is tax-exempt is
191. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text (determining ad valorem tax levied on
fee-patented lands to be permissible).
192. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 138 (estimating that twothirds of 40 million acres of total land allotted went into non-Indian ownership between inception of General Allotment Act in 1887 and enactment of IRA in 1934).
193. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 5, at 138 (noting that 60 million
acres of tribal land was sold as surplus land to homesteaders and corporations or was ceded
outright).
194. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 104, at 27 (discounting assertion by County of Yakima and its amici that fee-patented lands' immunity from state taxation
would be devastating). Only $10,718.75 in ad valorem taxes were levied against the Yakima
Nation in 1987. Id. On the other hand, the Federal Government has contributed over $3
million to Yakima Reservation school districts. Id. Policy questions would surely be raised
regarding the appropriateness of Indians benefiting from state services such as education if
they were not required to pay taxes that finance those services.
195. See Pat Doyle, Lean-budget Counties Cast Property-tax Eye on Indian Band Casinos, STAR
TRIB., Sept. 19, 1992, at IA (reporting on Minnesota county's intention to increase tax revenues by imposing tax on casino in accordance with Supreme Court deciion in County of
Yakima). White Earth members paid $375,000 in property taxes in 1991. Id. The chairman of
the White Earth Band estimated that the casino alone would produce $280,000 in annual state
property tax revenues for the county. Id.
196. Id
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more conducive to economic development. An otherwise risky
small business venture would have less overhead, thus freeing resources for further investment that would otherwise be paid for
taxes. The statute could therefore indirectly promote the economic
development of the tribal community, thereby furthering tribal selfdetermination.
For these reasons, Congress should pursue enacting legislation
similar to that proposed by this Note. The proposed statute is more
cost-effective and practical than the available solutions under the existing statutory scheme. The existing scheme supplies costly and
impractical means whereby fee-patented reservation lands can be
placed in trust on behalf of tribes, thus exempting the land from
state taxation. The proposed statute, on the other hand, is reflective
of current federal policy of preserving the tribal land base and promoting tribal self-determination.
CONCLUSION

In County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, the Supreme Court conferred to the states the power
necessary to diminish the tribal land base.1 9 7 By allowing the states
to impose an ad valorem tax on fee-patented lands owned by Indians and to further permit foreclosure on such parcels, the Court has
given states the power to diminish the tribal land base and thereby
contribute to the dissolution of what remains of tribal sovereignty
and integrity. Reservation Indians are among the poorest citizens in
this country.198 With suicide and despair on the rise among reservation Indians,' 9 9 land remains one of the few resources that offers
hope. By allowing foreclosures on fee-patented lands as a state gov197. See County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 692-93 (holding that County's ad valorem tax on
Indian-owned fee-patented reservation land is permissible); see also id.at 698 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority for '"justifying further erosions-through tax foreclosure actions as in this case-to the land holdings of the Indian
people").
198.

See, e.g., WILLIAM BROPHY ET AL., THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 62

(1966) ("The economic position of the Indians is less favorable than that of any other minority group."); SAR A. LEVrrAN & WILLIAM B.JOHNSTON, INDIAN GIVING: FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR

NATIVE AMERICANS 11 (1975) ("Indian per capita income is only half of whites.... [Tihe
the lowest among any ethnic group."); Presioverall Indian average [income] per year... [i]s
dent's Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564, 564 (July 8, 1970) ("On
virtually every scale of measurement-employment, income, education, health-the condition
of Indian people ranks at the bottom."). The 1980 census reported that 29% of reservation
Indians were living below the poverty level and that the per capita income for reservation
Indians was $3600. GETCHES & WILKINSON, supra note 41, at 8. The Bureau of Indian Affairs
reported reservation unemployment at 39% in 1983 and 1984. Id.
199. Youth Study Shows Grim Suicide Rates, NCAI SENTINEL, May 1992, at 5 (noting University of Minnesota study finding that Indian teens suffer from suicide rate four times higher
than other youths).
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ernmental remedy for tribal members' inability to pay ad valorem
real estate taxes, land is once again being taken away from Indian
people. While options are available under present statutory provisions, they would prove impractical in application. Congress should
therefore enact legislation that would exempt the land parcels at risk
from state taxation. Until Congress chooses to react, thousands of
acres of reservation land, as well as the livelihoods of many reservation Indians and tribes, will remain at risk.

